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ABSTRACT 
 
Take This Job and Shove it: 
A study of the politics of “technological change” in trucking 1971-1980 
by 
Virginia Hotchkiss Leavell 
 
This research investigates the politics of trucking technologies during a critical 
period in its history: 1971 to1980. I ask how different technologies were adopted by 
politically active trucking organizations, such a unions, organized independent truckers, and 
trucking carriers. The technologies I focus my research on are the ones most prevalent in the 
archival records, which are Citizen Band (CB) radios, mainframe computers, polygraph 
machines, and an attempted redesign of the cab. I ask, who initiated use of the new 
technologies, and what were the visible impacts of these technologies on those 
organizations? What, if anything, can we learn from this history about the nature of 
technology and technological change? 
Using a comparative historical case comparison method, I find that the technologies 
had a wide range of political and social impacts. Technologies like CB radios had a 
politically and culturally democratizing effect on both independent and union truckers. The 
mainframe computer functioned as an efficient management tool for both the International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters and trucking carriers. Finally, some technologies promoted by 
trucking carriers were perceived as exploitative by truckers and labor unions.  
  v 
I use these findings to speculate on the politics of two 21st century trucking technologies 
(automated platoons and Electronic Logging Devices) that may potentially impact drivers in 
similar ways to technologies used by management in the 1970’s.  
 
  vi 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Long haul trucking has been a battleground. In the 1970’s trucks were blown up 
outside of rest stops, shots rang out at protests, and key actors were murdered and 
disappeared. New technologies played a role in the fight during this decisive period for the 
US trucking industry. Understanding the ways in which technologies have impacted an 
important American industry during a critical juncture in its history is crucial for the study of 
technologies in that industry today.  
Studies of the sociology of technology are concerned with the social impact of 
technologies. When researching a technology, social scientists ask, for example, how 
software automation impacts tech workers and tech startups (Shestakofsky 2017), or how 
electronic logging devices (ELDs) impact the work of truck drivers (Levy 2015).  To answer 
a question about the social impact of a technology in the present day, it is necessary to 
unearth the history of that technology, as with the “sociability” of the telephone (Fischer 
1988), or with Marx’s ([1867] 1990) investigation of the use of industrial technology in 
factory production1.  
The study of the ways in which technologies impact work is a much-debated topic. 
The most common explanation is one of “skill biased technological change”, in which 
technologies reduce wages and demand for low-skilled workers (for review, see Morris and 
Western 1999). Other scholars have demonstrated specifically an effect of “class-biased 
technological change” (Kristal 2013). Others have argued convincingly from the macro-
                                                 
1 Karl Marx, EP Thompson, David Noble and Eric Hobsbawm all find similarly significant social history in 
the record of the Luddites in the early 19th century, for example. Rather than a record of the weavers’ 
technophobia, they find evidence of an organized class of workers facing exploitation exacerbated by new 
technologies, and as a response, attempting to reassert control over their labor process.  
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economic perspective that new technologies create new forms of employment over time 
(Autor 2015).  
Sociologists of technology also debate whether technologies have inherent politics. 
Researchers ask whether the internet has “built in” racism (Daniels 2018), or whether it leads 
structurally to a “digital divide” (Dimaggio et al. 2001). In researching the history of a 
technology with such a significant social impact as the internet, Castells (2000) posits an 
entirely new “network society”.   
To contribute to the discussion of the politics of technologies, I will be looking at the 
politics of trucking technologies. The American economy relies on trucking. Trucks transport 
66% of domestic freight in the United States (Bureau of Transportation Statistics 2017), and 
more than 3 million people work in the industry (Levy 2015). Today, new trucking 
technologies like automation and electronic monitoring are receiving attention in popular 
technology publications (Freedman 2017) but not yet very broadly in the sociological 
literature. Many of these technologies are still in testing phases internationally. 
Because the technologies are not yet widespread, we cannot yet gauge the impact of 
them on truckers or trucking organizations, or even determine whether they will ever be 
adopted at scale. To better approach a discussion about how automation and surveillance 
technologies may impact trucking organizations and truckers, I investigate the history of 
technologies in the same industry.   
I ask how different technologies were adopted by politically active trucking 
organizations, such a unions, organized independent truckers, and trucking carriers. The 
technologies I focus my research on are the ones most prevalent in the archival records, 
which are Citizen Band (CB) radios, mainframe computers, polygraph machines, and an 
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attempted redesign of the cab. I ask, who initiated use of the new technologies, and what 
were the visible impacts of these technologies on those organizations? What, if anything, can 
we learn from this history about the nature of technology and technological change? 
Outside of studies of CB radio, very little has been written about the use of 
technologies used during labor conflict in trucking, but there are other relevant technologies 
that show us how technological change impacts organizations.  In looking at a critical period 
of conflict in the 1970’s, I find for example that the International Brotherhood of Teamsters 
(IBT) invested in cutting edge, networked mainframe computers far in advance of standard 
commercial adoption, revealing how new technologies, when adopted by a labor union, can 
be used to strengthen labor organizations. In contrast, unions expended political capital to 
block use of technologies it perceived as threatening, like polygraph machines or cab 
redesigns. Additionally, some technologies had a democratizing impact, like CB radios, 
versus others that were used to more intimately control workers, such as the polygraph 
machine. After analyzing the impacts of four discreet technologies (CB radio, mainframe 
computers, polygraph machines, and a cab redesign) on three organizations (the IBT, private 
trucking carriers, and organized independent truckers), I will conclude with an initial 
comparison of the latter two management technologies to technological changes underway in 
the trucking industry today. 
 
A. Period, Methods, Data  
  
In this research I look at the use of technologies in the trucking industry in the period 
of 1971-1980. The decade was what Judith Stein (Stein 2010) calls a “pivotal decade” in 
which organized working class forces made a series of “last stands” in the twilight of post 
war liberalism. During these years many political and economic conflicts were legally settled 
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with the passage of various forms of federal deregulation. For trucking, deregulation is 
recognized as continuing to have demonstrable impacts, as it determined what wages and 
working conditions would be possible for truck drivers for the decades following (Belman 
and Monaco 2001). As technological change is intrinsic to both political and economic 
change (Noble 1984, Winner 1980), we must therefore investigate the role that it has played 
in labor conflict.   
Truckers experienced turbulent times, and quality for blue collar workers in general 
declined in the 1970’s. Many global political and economic factors led to this. Workers in 
this decade experienced the impacts of increased imports and offshore manufacturing (Wood 
1994), declining union density (Lichtenstein 2013), and a reduction in demand for a less-
educated workforce with the effect of skill-biased technological change (Bound and Johnson 
1992). In inter-industry comparisons, it has been found that each of these three factors 
contributed to the marked decline in truck drivers’ wages (Belman and Monaco 2001), it has 
been found that all three of these impacted truck drivers. Inflation and recession restructured 
the whole economy, and blue-collar workers were negatively impacted on all fronts. This 
paper does not attempt to isolate each of these political and economic variables, but rather 
investigate how different actors used and were affected by technologies during labor fights in 
the trucking industry during this time and considering this context.  
This historical period offers a rich field of analysis for trucking technologies for 
additional reasons. First, the decade was the beginning of the end of “middle class” working 
conditions for truckers (Belzer 2000). For truckers in the 1970’s, many claimed livable 
paychecks, reasonable working hours, and enjoyed some political clout. Astonishingly, when 
adjusting for inflation, the average trucker in 1980 made the equivalent of $110,000. (Viscelli 
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2016). In contrast, today the average trucker makes about $44,000 (Bureau of Labor Statistics 
2017).  As an industry that could not be swept up in the move to offshoring, the trucking 
industry experienced what Ruth Milkman (2006) calls "deunionization without 
deindustrialization” (p. 80)  In 1980, Congress passed legislation that deregulated the freight 
industry, removing the Interstate Commerce Commission's power to impose detailed 
regulatory tariffs on interstate carriers. Deregulation had catastrophic effects on unionized 
workers by opening up the industry to competition from non-union companies who sought to 
cut costs by avoiding unionization and curbing wages. Nearly 200 unionized carriers went out 
of business in the first few years of deregulation, leaving thirty percent of freight division 
Teamsters unemployed. The remaining unionized carriers demanded concessions in wages, 
work rules, and hours (Horwitz 1986). 
Second, the politics and labor struggles of the decade included a set of actors and 
interests in the form of a powerful network of loosely organized non-union truckers. These 
truckers call themselves “owner operators,” and after 1980 they would become the standard 
form of employment in the industry, replacing the norm of unionized employee drivers 
(Dinardo and Lemieux 1997). These truckers associated under the umbrella of Overdrive 
Magazine and its affiliated Independent Trucker Association (ITA), “Overdrive 
Roadmasters”.  The Overdrive network published opinion pieces and investigative reports, 
held national conventions, and engaged in other political activity. As most truckers today are 
owner-operators, I will analyze the technologies used during this shift in employment form.  
Finally, I find that an ensemble of cutting edge technologies stocked the war chests of 
the fight to control the industry throughout the decade. Technologies impact wages and 
quality of work in the trucking industry (Belman and Monaco 2001). In the case of the period 
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between the 1971 resignation and imprisonment of controversial Teamster General President 
James Hoffa and federal deregulation of the industry in 1980, I find that emerging 
technologies like CB radio, mainframe computers, and technical redesigns of the cab and 
established technologies like the polygraph machine impacted organizations in labor conflict.  
If we can understand the politics behind and impact of technologies during this pivotal 
decade, we have a framework with which to make early analyses about 21st century 
technologies and how this may impact those working within the trucking industry today.  
 
Table 1: Data Sources and Technologies 
Organizations 
 
Data Sources Relevant Technologies 
International 
Brotherhood of 
Teamsters (IBT) 
Teamster archival records (12 boxes), incl: 
Economics and Contracts records 1970-1981, 
International Convention Records 1971-1981. 
Teamster Magazine 1970-1981 (≈ 4600 pages), 
archival news coverage 
 
Mainframe computer, 
CB radios, polygraph, 
cab redesign 
Independent 
Truckers 
(Overdrive)  
Overdrive Magazine archives April 1973-Nov 
1976 (≈ 5700 pages), archival news coverage, film 
 
CB radios 
Private Trucking 
Carrier & 
Association (Yale, 
ATA) 
Congressional testimony records, archival news 
coverage 
Polygraph, cab redesign, 
mainframe computers, 
CB radios 
 
To answer my questions, I look at three key political organizations in trucking 
between 1971 and 1980. For “political”,  I use Weber's definition of politics, meaning the 
“exerting influence on the government of a political organization, especially at the 
appropriation, expropriation, redistribution or allocation of powers of government”(Weber  
[1968] 2013 :54), and by “organization” I again use Weber’s definition, in that an 
organization is, “a social group which is either closed or limits the admission of outsiders” 
(ibid: 48). Furthermore, an organization engages in “organized action”, which is “(a) either 
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the staff’s action… or (b) the members’ action as directed by the staff” (ibid).  The 
organizations I analyze are a labor union, a trucking association and individual carrier, and 
organized independent truckers. 
 These organizations were major political actors during this critical juncture and still 
function today as sites of conflict between capital and labor (Bloch 2007). The impact of the 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) on labor conflict in the trucking industry is 
significant because the IBT was the most powerful union in the United States during this 
period, representing 450,000 truck drivers (La Botz 1990). Independent, non-union truck 
drivers similarly reached an apex of political organized action during the 1970’s (Hamilton 
2008). 
 I use a comparative historical case comparison approach to demonstrate how 
technologies impact work, workers, and organizations. This research builds on the methods 
and findings developed in the sociology of technology, and I use Langdon Winner’s theory of 
“political technologies” to analyze how this package of technologies impacted the political 
trucking organizations that used or resisted them. Langdon Winner’s theory holds that 
technologies fall into one of two categories: either a technical device can serve to “settle an 
issue in the affairs of a particular community”,  or  technologies are “inherently political”, in 
which a device or system is “strongly compatible with particular kinds of political 
relationships” (Winner 1988:22).  
In the first instance, the politics of a technology depend on its stakeholders and the 
social relationships in which it is used. Winner uses the example of Robert Moses’s 
construction of low overpasses on the Long Island Parkway to rule out the ability of public 
buses to access desirable public beach parks.  While bridges are more generally built with the 
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intention of transporting people and vehicles, the specific deployment of low bridges resolves 
an issue (the arrival of working class people to the wealthy enclave) for the politically and 
economically powerful communities that approved their construction. In this study, 
mainframe computers function in this manner. 
The second instance of Winner’s theory is that some technologies are “inherently 
political”, in that they are strongly compatible with a particular sociological system (ibid). 
Winner argues that some technologies require and lead to social and political concentrations 
of power, hierarchy, or even totalitarianism. The classic example here is that of the atom 
bomb, or of nuclear power. In this study, the polygraph machine, cab redesign, and CB radio 
function in this way.   
My sources are the primary and secondary source material for the three cases in 
question. In this study the independent variables are the technologies at play in trucking 
politics during the periods of comparison. I selected technologies that are discussed and 
documented repeatedly in the archival records of either the International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters, Overdrive magazine or the Overdrive Roadmasters organization, as well as in 
news coverage or congressional debate. To interpret these variables, I asses for each one the 
use of the technology, its description, advocacy and defense by its users, and the impact the 
technology had on both the organization and industry at large.  
Regarding independent truckers, I look to “radical conservative” trucker Mike 
Parkhurst’s leadership of the anti-union, independent truckers’ political activity (Hamilton 
2008: 187). Besides organizing nationwide protests against monopolies and unions, Parkhurst 
started the immensely popular Overdrive Magazine, “The Voice of the American Trucker”. 
The magazine has been in print ever since and is still widely read. 
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For primary sources, I accessed the official Teamsters archive at George Washington 
University’s special collections in Washington DC. For this research I analyzed records from 
the 1971, 1976, and 1981 international conventions, including correspondence, planning 
materials, draft and final speeches, and convention publications. I also analyzed all of the 
“Teamsters Magazine” from 1970 to 1980, a monthly publication distributed to union 
membership. Finally, I included correspondence between the union and regional staff, press 
clippings, and contracts. For technologies advocated by the trucking management, I depend 
on the news and congressional records and news coverage of the companies, as I was unable 
to access any private company carrier archives.  
I hypothesized that technologies would have affected political trucking organizations 
during this period in three ways. First, I anticipated that the CB radio would have been widely 
adopted and politically important to both independent and union truckers, but that the 
organizations’ leadership would respond to the technology in different ways. As the IBT 
roiled with internally dissident democratic union struggles, I anticipated that IBT leadership 
may have limited its approval of, or even worked to limit access to the radios, while the 
Overdrive leadership would more zealously use and defend the technology, as it aligned with 
their independent, libertarian political project. If this were true, it would suggest that the CB 
radio has inherently democratizing politics.  
Second, I anticipated that the IBT would use its investment in a mainframe computer 
to resolve a “key issue” that it faced, such as corruption charges, dissident membership 
factions, or labor disputes with trucking companies. Trucking companies, having at their 
disposal similar capital as the IBT, would also invest in mainframe computers to increase 
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profit and control over the industry. Thus, the technology would solve their mutual but 
opposing problems of managing a national organization. 
Finally, I hypothesized that the history of technologies developed by or exclusively 
promoted by trucking carriers, like polygraph machines and cab redesigns, would be 
understood by truckers to be against their interest therefore resisted in the public sphere. I 
anticipated that the IBT and Overdrive network would not use or support these technologies.  
 
 
B. Theoretical Perspectives on “Technological Change”  
 
All technologies hold stories of alternative futures. The technologies in trucking, like 
technologies more broadly, “embody essential characteristics that are bound to alter the 
nature of work”(Zuboff 1988: 7). By taking a closer look at the use of technologies during the 
unraveling of what had until 1971 been a largely unionized and regulated industry, we find 
signs that “technical systems of various kinds are deeply interwoven in the conditions of 
modern politics” (Winner 1988: 20). But what were those politics, and what new story of the 
1970’s do we find in the futures hoped for by promoters of this suite of technologies?  
Technologies do not float independently through the world as in a vacuum. Their 
purpose and impact depend on their social context.  When considering the effect of any 
specific technology on work and workers, we need to assess its social world. This is not an 
easy task. The social world of technologies is murky. An analysis of a technology must 
include labor contracts, management philosophy, the process of its introduction, and the 
original reasons for its introduction (Liker, Haddad, and Karlin 1999).  
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 Different social contexts result in entirely different outcomes for even the same 
technologies. For example, Barley (1986) studied the introduction of CT scanners in two 
different hospitals and found that the impacts differed greatly depending on the structure of 
the radiology departments. Hierarchy, roles and work flows changed with the integration of 
the scanners. This reveals that technologies are not simply physical objects but rather social, 
and that the structures around them need to be understood as processes rather than entities 
(Barley 1986: 78). 
 Employers use new technologies to effect more effective workplace control(Foucault 
1995; Levy 2015; Ball 2010; Pierce, Snow, and McAfee 2015) or to make possible a 
technical fix to rising wages and worker organization (Silver 2003; Braverman 1998).  
General anxiety over technological unemployment has swelled throughout history (Winner 
1988; Bix 2000) and continues to be forecast today (Ford 2015; Frey and Osborne 2017; 
Brynjolfsson 2014). In response to the drumbeat of deterministic concern, others have argued 
that while the effect of new technologies has been to displace some workers, data shows that 
new technologies create new job opportunities overall (Autor 2015; Bessen 2015). Looking 
towards what alternate political futures are possible with new technologies, some theorize an 
abundant, post-work automated future (Dyer-Witheford 1999; Srnicek 2015; Weeks 2011).  
Historian of technology and automation David Noble was perplexed by social 
conditions of anti-worker technologies (emphasis mine)2.  
There is a war on, but only one side is armed: this is the essence of the technology 
question today. On the one side is private capital, scientized and subsidized, mobile 
and global, and now heavily armed with military-spawned command, control, and 
communication technologies. Empowered by the second Industrial Revolution, capital 
is moving decisively now to enlarge and consolidate the social dominance it secured 
                                                 
2 His main point in Forces of Production being that there have been and will continue to be other options in 
the development of technologies, and that the technologies adopted are those that most benefit capital.  
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in the first… On the other side, those under assault hastily abandon the field for lack 
of an agenda, an arsenal, or an army. Their own comprehension and critical abilities 
confounded by the cultural barrage, they take refuge in alternating strategies of 
appeasement and accommodation, denial and delusion, and reel in desperate disarray 
before this seemingly inexorable onslaught- which is known in polite circles as 
“technological change” (Noble 1984:8).  
 
In this “war”, Noble was particularly frustrated with the “friends of labor”3  perennial 
rejection of workers’ desire to put technology on the negotiation table. This is a reoccurring 
issue. 
Unions do not always lose to “technological change”. The International Longshore 
Workers’ Union (ILWU) famously succeeded in “red circling” existing longshore workers, 
allowing in automation technologies while guaranteeing wage and pension rates for existing 
workers for life. Harry Bridges, ILWU leader, is often quoted as summing up the situation, 
“at this rate, by the year 2000 there will be one longshoreman left on the West Coast, but he’s 
going to be the best paid son of a bitch in the United States”(Kuttner 1987: 1982). 
 
II. CB RADIOS  
 
CB radios had a democratizing impact on both independent trucker and dissident factions 
truckers within the IBT. When looking at the radios’ impacts more broadly, we see the 
technology function as “democratic platform.. organized as an interactive social 
medium”(Young 1985: 69). In trucking, they were used in the first case to organize 
demonstrations against impacts of the oil crisis and in the second for wildcat strikes against 
employers. Additionally, there was a fascinating and broad “technical cultural” credited to the 
radios(Haring 2007). IBT leadership did not included the radio technology in official 
publications several years after the boom in CB usage. I did not find clear impacts on 
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trucking carriers, except for a few accusations by independent truckers of attempts to support 
removal of the radios, which I include briefly at the end of this section.  
 
A. Independent Truckers Shift into Overdrive  
 
“Only Outlaws Will Have CB Radios” (Overdrive March 1975: 77) 
 
We don't smoke marijuana in Muskogee 
We don't take our trips on LSD 
We don't burn our draft cards down on Main Street 
We like livin' right, and bein' free 
  -Merle Haggard, “Okie From Muskogee”  
 
When President Nixon invited country legend Merle Haggard to perform at the White 
House in 1973, it wasn’t because he liked that “outlaw4” sound. Haggard’s fans saw 
themselves as hard working, hard playing, independent souls, and they were becoming a 
political force.  Nixon wanted some of that working-class cowboy dust to rub off on his 
presidency. Many of Haggards’ fans were truckers, and when they sang along with his songs 
like “I Take Pride in What I Am” and “Working Class Blues” when they were behind the 
wheel, the one thing many of them complained of more than big government was mafia 
corruption in the IBT. A typical headline in the favorite magazine of the independent truckers 
read, “Central State Pension Fund Continues to Bankroll Organized Crime” (Overdrive, 
January 1973) 
Independent truckers as a case were primarily impacted by CB radio technology. The 
radios made possible violent national protests against diesel prices and new speed limits that 
                                                                                                                                                       
3 By which he means labor unions 
4 Outlaw country music was a subgenre made popular in the 1970’s by Johnny Cash, Willie Nelson, Merle 
Haggard, Waylon Jennings, and Kris Kristofferson. The musicians considered themselves a reaction the highly 
polished Nashville sound, and were famous for hard living, jail time, and drug use. Willie Nelson is additionally 
famous for smoking marijuana at the White House during the Carter administration, and for being the only 
person who could out-smoke Snoop Dogg.  
 14 
 
affected highway transport in many states. Furthermore, music and film incorporated the 
radios into mass cultural celebrations of cowboy trucking culture.  Finally, dissident 
democratic factions within the union, such as the Fraternal Association of Steel Haulers 
(FASH) made use of the CB radio in their efforts to win better contracts.  
 
1. A Technology for Politics 
 
  
Overdrive magazine was a political organization housed in a magazine’s offices. The 
magazine reported to have more than 75,000 subscribers every month (Hamilton 2008) and 
readers and members of the affiliated Overdrive Roadmasters organization gathered annually 
at conventions (Overdrive August 1973: 31). The magazine’s owner, Mike Parkhurst, 
published monthly reports on the organization’s lobbying and other political activity.  
The organization demonstrated a libertarian politics5. Members lobbied against 
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) (Overdrive May 1974: 40) regulations, published 
harsh critiques of inability of small carriers to get licenses to transport interstate freight, and 
advocated in general for free competition and small government. One issue included an 
exclusive interview with Chicago school economist Milton Friedman, in which the editor 
celebrated him as a fellow “believer in free enterprise” (Overdrive March 1973: 60-64). 
Editors led the interview with an endorsement, writing, “[i]f the measures Milton Friedman 
proposes would be adopted the American trucker would enjoy more freedom and benefits in 
the trucking industry than he has had since trucking developed a half century ago”(ibid).  
                                                 
5 Overdrive celebrated the right wing truckers’ union who struck against socialist Salvador Allende, for 
example. The magazine’s story, coming out after the first limited attempt at a US highway blockade informed 
readers that “forty give thousand owner-operator truckers banded together to be help spark the overthrow of the 
 15 
 
Overdrive’s membership base was made up of independent owner-operator (as 
oppose to company employee) truckers. ITA Overdrive Roadmasters advertised to members 
with a tagline, “only a trucker can understand another trucker’s problems, feelings, hopes, 
and needs” (Overdrive January 1973: 101)6. Like an outlaw’s backup plan, the organization 
could cover bail if a member got arrested, cover him on breakdowns, and pay out benefits in 
the event of the driver’s death. The magazine summed up its base in one issue: “What kind of 
trucker subscribes to Overdrive? Gutsy self-sufficient, far-sighted, qualified, go-getter, 
reliable, wise, rugged” (Overdrive, July 1973: 146). If drivers wanted to celebrate the national 
highway shutdowns, Overdrive advertised limited edition commemorative pewter belt 
buckles. (Overdrive May 1974: 29). For drivers, affiliation with the magazine was a public 
statement made loudly, and with pride.  
Overdrive made regular appeals to Teamster rank and file to get politically active. 
They published articles with headlines like “Members Can Halt Pension Fund Thievery by 
Top Union Officials” (Overdrive February 1973: 63). The magazine published intricately 
researched investigative pieces on IBT pension fund activity. They included copies of leases 
properties they believed to paid for with pension funds for the benefit of the mob, leaked 
financial records, and anonymous quotes from IBT sources. Photos exposed golf outings 
between IBT officials and known mafia men. One source allegedly boasted to an Overdrive 
staffer that “there’s so much Pension Fund money coming in that we can’t steal it fast 
enough” (ibid). The magazine took credit for sparking a grand jury investigation into the IBT 
with its coverage of the organization’s corrupt financial activity (Overdrive, June 1973). 
                                                                                                                                                       
President’s regime. “Country Roads” is a pretty song, but it appears that only Chilean truckers have the actual 
guts to blockade the roads of their country” (Overdrive October 1973: 68). 
6 A challenge to the union option.  
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Import statistics shows that CB radio growth exploded between 1975 and 1977, and 
with as many as 50-million sets being imported from Japan, one third of all trucks on the road 
in the United States had the radios installed by 1976 (Watts & Barton 2011: 389). Drivers 
praised CB radios for many reasons, including safety and conversation, but the political event 
that is credited for inspiring their mass appeal was President Nixon’s 55 mile per hour 
mandate in the wake of the first OPEC oil crisis (ibid). They knew they could make a 
political impact if they took advantage of the radios. The magazine published favorable 
coverage of a convoy of 597 coal trucks protesting a strip mining bill, and made special note 
to inform readers that the demonstration was made possible by organizing carried out by a 
few truckers using CB radios. (Overdrive May 1975:32).  
During the twin oil crises of 1973 and 1979 oil supplies plummeted and gas prices 
skyrocketed. At that time the United States was importing 36 percent of its oil, and the 
embargo hit hard. Americans were unable to fill their gas tanks and a national “panic at the 
pump” took hold. (Jacobs 2016) The crisis was sparked by the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries’ (OPEC) threat of reducing overall oil production by 25% and decision 
to embargo oil exports to the United States in retaliation for President Richard Nixon’s 
backing of Israel against an attack from Syria and Egypt during the Yom Kippur War. The 
price of a barrel of oil went from $3 to $5 overnight, the “single largest price increase in the 
history of the industry”(Jacobs 2016: 53). Oil imports plummeted and consumers were 
whipped into a “panic at the pump”, forced to wait in long lines for even a few gallons of gas 
(ibid).  President Richard Nixon attempted to resolved the energy crisis with “Project 
Independence”, mandating reduced speed limits, imposing price controls, and rationing gas. 
Many of the country’s independent truckers did not comply.  
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The CB radio was easy to use and just as easy to avoid Federal Communication 
Commission (FCC) licensing rules. Newly able to communicate with other drivers within a 
150-mile radius, truckers found themselves no longer alone at the wheel. The job changed. 
Truckers used CB radio to warn each other about speed traps and other road hazards. The 
radios inspired new jargon, like “bear in the air” for helicopter cops and CB handles like 
“Dopey Diesel”, “Big Sissy”, and “Doggy Daddy”, heroes of the 1973 shut down of Interstate 
84 between New York and Connecticut (Hamilton 2008).  
 Truckers used the radios to organize years of rebellions against the 55-mph speed 
limit and spiking diesel prices. A 1974 trucking shut downs affected highway transportation 
in forty-two states for eleven days. Gun shots were reported in four states and two people 
were dead before highways would reopened (Associated Press 1974). Truckers blocked diesel 
pumps, covered the highway with nails, cut brake lines and shot up the tires of trucks whose 
drivers tried to keep on the roads.   On December 4, just under two thousand independent 
truckers blocked the Delaware Memorial Bridge between Delaware and New Jersey. CB 
Radios enabled a high level of organization, as noted by one historian of radio, and “[t]he 
scattered trucks became a free-floating rebel network linked by radio, the American 
equivalent of Radio Alice’s wireless protest network” (Walker 2001: 273). 
In contrast, IBT leadership condemned the highway shut downs. General President 
Fitzsimmons wrote in the Teamster Magazine that, “Unfortunately, there are those who take 
things into their own hands when a problem exists, and those who blocked highways did our 
cause more harm than good” (Teamster Magazine, March 1974: 4). The unions response 
would be to reopen negotiation of the National Master Freight Agreement to negotiate a fix to 
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the speed limit and hours of service regulations. Taking an extra dig at Parkhurst, 
Fitzsimmons wrote,  
I was particularly distressed with reports that many drivers who wanted to run were 
intimidated and forced off the road. And, it was particularly distressing to see that 
those who openly advocated illegal means were given easy access to certain 
government offices. And, of course, media flocked to their side and to the side of 
certain other recognized individuals, including the editor of the bankrupt magazine, 
Overdrive. The effect of all of this could have a reverse result, possibly resulting in 
legislating the independent truck owner out of business(ibid).  
 
Some Teamster members did take part in the highway shut downs, but Fitzsimmons 
pleaded for law and order solutions to the nation’s problems.  
 Overdrive participants in the strikes tracked a quick response by both government 
and company carriers to put in place measures that would make future civil disobedience 
more difficult. Just a few months after the first shut down, carriers began issuing memos to 
ban CB radios from company rigs, sometimes offering the explanation of “safety factors”. 
(Overdrive October 1974: 68) The FCC, tracking the boom in CB purchases after the passage 
of the March 1974 federal 55 mph speed limit and usage in the highway strikes, heightened 
its regulatory efforts. By 1982 the FCC abandoned any licensing requirement (Watts and 
Barton 2011). 
Overdrive published monthly reports on government, company, or union infringement 
on drivers’ rights to use CB radios. One report warned readership, “you are all aware that the 
federal government is turning up the heat on truckers with CB radios. Illegal confiscation of 
radio equipment is reported on the increase” (Overdrive October 1974: 65).   Most drivers did 
not bother with licensing rules. An FCC survey at inspection stations in 40 states reports 
show that of the over thirty-six thousand trucks inspected, more than half of the drivers with 
CB radios did not have licenses(Watts and Barton 2011). Overdrive reports that most of those 
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radios are in owner-operator trucks, and that “you can bet your last cup of coffee that they are 
going to do everything in their power to get CB radios banned from trucks. And the unions 
will back them all the way on this matter” (Overdrive October 1974: 65). 
Overdrive truckers displayed a sense of ownership over the new technology and 
intervened in trucking CB radio standards and uses. Through Overdrive magazine, drivers 
discussed problems with radio usage and suggested changes in their use of the technology. 
One problem they faced was non-trucker complaints about truckers on the air. The FCC 
received complaints about both language and the amount of time some drivers stayed on the 
air. One tactic organized through the magazine was to herd drivers onto separate channels. In 
1974, for example, magazine writers pleaded with readership that,  
“…there is something else you can do improve your image and take a lot of heat off 
independent operators… Starting on December 1st, let’s get off Channel 10 and 
switch to Channel 21 with Channel 19 as a backup.. you can take a positive step to 
improve the trucker’s image with the rest of CB operators and, in effect, get our own 
channel at the same time” (Overdrive October 1974: 66) 
 
The debate over CB channels continued over several months in the magazine, with 
drivers writing in about the shift to channel 21, or complaints about drivers failing to move 
off channel 10.  
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Figure 1: Overdrive depiction of FCC and police taking away CB radio. (Overdrive Magazine October 
1974)  
 
 
2. A New Technical Subculture 
 
 
The CB radio influenced a new trucking culture. CB radio culture was not thought of 
very highly by other amateur radio users. Whereas ham radio operators, for example, were 
required to pass a rigorous test from the FCC, learn Morse Code, and develop advanced radio 
engineering skills necessary to build much of their own radio sets, CB radios were cheap, 
easy to use, and operated often without a license. In contrast to the professional, patriotic, 
upper middle-class ham radio operators, CB radio users were working class, lawbreaking 
truckers and civil rights organizers coordinating activity in the field (Haring 2007). 
CB radio culture was present in public independent trucker correspondence and 
commentary. Readers wrote in to Overdrive magazine to debate which channel to use for 
trucker communications, complain about drivers who talked too much, and signed off letters 
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with handles like “Diesel Daddy”. Memorials were published in the death of popular CB 
personalities, like the beloved Nite Rider (Overdrive Magazine, November 1975: 79-90), or 
“Sugar Bear”( (Overdrive Magazine, April 1975: 34), the only fair traffic cop out there. 
Overdrive sponsored a national “CB Radio Club” and promised members to “protect their 
right to own a CB radio” (Overdrive Magazine, September 1974: 128) and keep them abreast 
of FCC politics. 
In the trucker genre films churned out by Hollywood during the latter half of the 
decade, the radios were every character’s sidekick. We know the stars by their handles. In 
Convoy (1978), one of the most popular of the genre, Rubber Duck (“The Duck”), Pig Pen 
and Spider Mike stand up to a dirty cop and inspire a mile-long protest convoy headed across 
state lines. The Duck, played by outlaw country music heartthrob Kris Kristofferson, is a 
humble anti-hero without a plan. When reporters drive alongside him and query his demands, 
he defers to the convoy behind him, who are happy to mouth off about one of dozens of 
complaints. Perhaps this reflects how the public perceived the chaotic highway protests of the 
time.  
In other box office hits Smokey the Bandit (1977) and White Line Fever (1975), 
truckers and their CB radios take on other villains making real life headlines, like corrupt 
companies, illegal cargo haulers, and the mafia. The epic cross-country chase scenes 
showcase the skills of drivers and the beauty of their rigs.   
In a little-know early addition to the genre, Overdrive’s Mike Parkhurst wrote, 
directed Moonfire (1970), his first and only filmmaking attempt. The story is pedantic and 
convoluted, and the acting amateur and awkward. The story circles a reclusive billionaire 
aerospace engineer who falls into the hands of an evil and elderly Nazi hiding out in Mexico. 
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Two truckers are tasked with saving the engineer and, we are told, the world. The crooning 
voice of country ballad singer Marty Robbins carries the entire soundtrack. Out on the road 
our heroes expound on the corruption of the ICC, the joys of owning one’s own rig, and the 
helpfulness of the CB radio for accidents and as a cure for loneliness behind the wheel. 
Parkhurst includes long, tedious sequences of the truckers loading boxes lettuce into a rig, 
and lets the camera linger too long on gleaming chrome engines. A true ideologue, he casts 
government staffers as sweaty and shifty eyed men in suits, and corporate bosses as soft, 
desk-bound idiots. The film embodies the chaotic, anti-authoritarian spirit of Parkhurst’s 
movement. The film doesn’t maintain congruent editing or coherent plot lines. It’s an 
Overdrive film, and Overdrive billed it as “the most authentic trucking film ever made” 
(Moonfire (1973) n.d.) . 
Drivers participated in creating culture about and with the radios. Many shared stories 
of lives saved on desolate, winter roads because of the radios (Overdrive September 1974: 
90-94). Overdrive readers wrote that the general public did not understand the challenge and 
risk of their jobs. They lambasted tourists and home users for misusing the radios and giving 
truckers a bad name. There was of course no shortage of scorn for the bureaucrats in 
Washington who, in their deliberations over CB radio regulations in their “nice and warm” 
offices, certainly thought little of drivers. After all, “if you’re a trucker, the public thinks 
you’re nothing” (Overdrive Magazine, February 1974: 23). Drivers even composed poems 
about the radios,   
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The Trucker’s Bible 
 
I have a “Trucker’s Bible”, 
And it never lets me down. 
It tells me where the Smokies 
And the Radar can be found  
 
It tells me of the road ahead 
And dangers I can’t see.  
The ‘Bible’ that I speak of  
Is my little old “C.B.” 
 
It lets me talk to other truckers 
As we roll on thru the night  
And when the sun at last comes up 
The day seems twice as bright.  
 
I have no fear of getting lost, 
Or making delivery late 
As me and my ‘Bible’ 
Go trucking State to State. 
 
I never go out on the road 
Without my trusty ears, 
They save me time and money 
As I shift those 13 gears. 
 
The FCC don’t like our ‘handles’ 
And they check us now and then 
But I’m called the ‘Pink Panther” 
When I break on Channel 10 
-Paul C. Leatherman 
 Smithsburg, Maryland 
 (Overdrive October 1974: 68) 
 
 
The individual involvement made possible by the CB radio suggests a broad democratizing 
impact, both politically and culturally. The level at which drivers made the technology their 
own, and used its capacity for mobilization and celebration of trucking is an important facet 
to identify in a larger discussion of how technologies affect the industry. We see signs of 
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similar political involvement with union drivers unsatisfied with the contracts negotiated on 
their behalf by IBT representatives.  
 
B. Dissident Tech: Political CB Radio Usage within the Teamsters 
 
“‘Get the gun out, Tack, get the gun out!’ the call came over the citizens’ band radio.”  
(Flint 1978) 
 
In comparing the official publications of the IBT and Overdrive, the quantity of 
references to CB radio is markedly different. In a simple comparison of frequency of 
references, Overdrive magazine includes dramatically more discussion on the technology. 
While the outcome is limited by the availability of Overdrive magazine post 1976, the 
results capture what is apparent when reading through both publications. I expanded the 
Teamster Magazine search two additional years, because the references to the radios did not 
begin until an article in the April 1976 issue titled “CB Sweeping the Airwaves”. 
Table 2: Frequency of CB Radio mentions 
Publication Teamster Magazine (1973-1978) Overdrive Magazine (1973-Nov 1976) 
References to “CB 
Radio” 
29 343 
 
Official Teamster commentary on the topic mostly covered instructions on how to 
purchase a quality radio, or how to adhere to FCC rules and regulations. There were no 
letters from union members on the topic of the technology, or discussion that included any 
political activity in relation to the radios. The only subset of union activity I was able to 
identify came from secondary and news sources, which covered the dissident union faction 
of the Fraternal Association of Steel Haulers (FASH), who were reported to use the radios to 
organize wildcat strikes.  
  25 
Within a few years of General President Frank Fitzsimmons’ ascendance to power in 
1971, “the union had become the dictatorship of the general president”(La Botz 1990:10).  
Fitzsimmons possessed neither the political acumen nor the charisma of his predecessor, 
James Hoffa. He faced internal challenges by oppositional rank and file organizers in the 
wake of a badly negotiated renewal of the National Master Freight Agreement (NMFA), 
Hoffa’s national contract legacy. In 1964 the IBT had been at an apex of power and James 
Hoffa’s successful negotiation of the first NMFA was a stunning achievement7. More than 
450,000 truck drivers were covered by the contract, and the union hoped to negotiate 
national contracts in more industries in the future(“Master Freight Agreement” n.d.) .  
The dissident faction of FASH inspired 40,000 members to go on wild cat strikes in 
1978 and 1979 recalling the militancy of the Hoffa era (Hamilton 2008: 212). Fitzsimmons 
fended off rank and file demands for a democratic union from FASH and Teamsters for a 
Democratic Union (TDU) until his death in 1981.  
IBT membership had long included a small subset of owner-operator truck drivers. 
By 1979, there were around 30,000 steel haulers in the United States, including both owner-
operators and company drivers. The IBT represented about 10,000 of both classifications of 
workers. Owner-operator members had unique complaints of the industry, including long 
periods of waiting for cargo without payment, and additional costs of maintaining their rigs.   
(Flint 1978). The press record shows that dissident IBT membership used CB radios to 
organize against the union in demand of better contracts, but the conclusions we can draw 
are little more than an acknowledgement of the use of the technology by the group for 
similar purposes as the Overdrive truckers. 
                                                 
7 When the company confronted a possible bankruptcy a few years later, Hoffa was be asked for “financial 
support” to help keep the company afloat (Seeger 1965), exposing the close relationship that the former 
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A Rolling Stone writer reporting on the FASH, quoted a veteran organizer on the 
topic of the group’s complaints with their union,  
These people [independent drivers] go overseas every 20 years to fight a war for 
democracy, they come home, go to work for a trucking company that's under the 
Teamsters and all of a sudden, they haven't any rights at all. Their balls shrivel up to 
the size of peas and they won't stand up to nothin' ... We decided to change that. 
(Harris 1974). 
 
Additionally, the New York Times reported on a violent FASH strike, unauthorized by 
the IBT, and included the CB radio conversation and calls for weapons: 
  
“Close it up, Dave, keep it tight,” came the CB instruction to the No. 2 truck. 
 
“You can't keep it tight all the way to the barn,” came an anonymous voice. 
 
After a mile or two, a sharp crack startled Dave. A rock had hit his door. A few 
moments later a white Plymouth pulled in front of the No. 2 truck, and a passenger in 
the car began throwing nails onto the highway. The police escort was nowhere to be 
seen. 
 
“They're throwing nails out,” Dave shouted over his CB. 
 
“We got 15 carloads of mad truck drivers behind us and you're worried about nails,” 
a trucker replied cheerily. 
 
“It's not what's behind you, you should worry about. It's the ones in front,” came an 
anonymous voice. 
 
“O.K. Cartage, another half‐hour, and you're going to lose your escort,” the voice 
said. The last truck in the convoy would be the target, it warned. “We're going to give 
him a beating.” 
 
The Ohio police that had been expected at the border were not there. The two lead 
trucks made it through the stoplight at Coitsville, but the last four stopped for it. Men 
from a trailing car jumped out and pulled the connecting pin that attaches the trailer 
and cab from the last truck. 
 
The truck driver opened his door to get the license plate number of the car. A rock 
came through the open door and the driver, ducking, tumbled out. 
 
                                                                                                                                                      
General President had with some companies under contract with the union.   
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“I saw this guy coming right at me,” the driver said later, “and I slugged him.” That 
started a melee. 
 
He was outnumbered, and there were clubs, too. The call for guns went over the CB. 
Other drivers ran toward their surrounded comrade; Jack fired his Magnum into the 
air repeatedly. (Flint 1978). 
 
In this example, the truck drivers are engaged in a strike while operating their rigs, using 
the vehicles as closely formed protest caravan.  Without CB radios, a demonstration of this 
kind would be difficult, if not impossible.  
 
C. Carriers Crackdown on CB  
 
The ATA and individual carriers cracked down on both licensed and unlicensed CB 
radio usage, and Overdrive magazine published copies of original notices received by drivers 
on the subject of CB radios. Drivers received a letter in from the ATA Research and 
Technical Safety Division warning of fines and confiscation for unlicensed CB usage. The 
notice cited concern for increased risk of accidents due to the drivers’ radio use (Overdrive 
October 1974: 65-77).  
Some individual trucking carriers enacted their own crackdowns on the radios. A bulletin 
board notice from the McLean Trucking Company informed drivers that “Citizen Band 
Radios are barred from company owned equipment or equipment on lease to our company”( 
ibid). The Mushroom Transportation Company informed all drivers in January 1974 that due 
to “electrical problems” caused by the radios that “[a]nyone found with a Citizen Band 
Radio in their unit will have disciplinary action taken against them” (ibid).  
 
III. MAINFRAME COMPUTERS  
 
Mainframe computers were used both by the IBT and trucking carriers. I look at one 
large trucker carrier’s investment in an IBM computer after signing the National Master 
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Freight Agreement with the IBT, five years before IBT’s acquiring of their computer system.  
A very great expense, the machines were used for data management and communications, 
and, for the trucking carrier included here, efficient management of logistics. The IBT 
expressed a desire to compete with the corporations with whom they negotiated contracts.  
 
A. Technology and the Union: “21st Century Stuff”  
 
The 70’s technological package impacted the International Brotherhood of Teamsters 
in myriad ways. The technology most engaged with by the union, the mainframe computer, 
demonstrates Winner’s first category, wherein the technology resolved an issue within the 
organization. Union leadership saw great political advantage in the new networked computer 
systems becoming available for commercial use.  
I did not find evidence that the Overdrive network invested in early mainframe 
computing, While further research is needed to confirm the reason for this absence, I have 
several early hypotheses. The key differences between most truckers associated with 
Overdrive and the truckers of the IBT is their employment status (independent versus 
employee), and access to resources. A relatively small organization like Overdrive, when 
compared to the IBT, did not have resources to invest in mainframe computing. 
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General President Fitzsimmons took control over the IBT in 1971. The former 
General President James R. Hoffa, beloved by the rank and file, but allegedly in league with 
the mob, and respected by the company carriers, was imprisoned for jury tampering, bribery, 
and fraud. Hoffa tapped Fitzsimmons, his general secretary, to stand in as General President 
until he was out of prison. Fitzsimmons had a different vision for his role, however, and 
maneuvered quickly to shift the balance of power. Fitzsimmons negotiated a release of Hoffa 
with Nixon in return for the IBT’s endorsement of is campaign and on condition that Hoffa 
recuse himself from union activity. Upon release, Hoffa began campaign for his old job, 
promising to fight this time to ride the union of the mob. The most accepted version of the 
events at this point is the mafia (La Cosa Nostra) preferred the more malleable Fitzsimmons 
the helm, warned Hoffa several times to desist, and then finally assassinated him. Hoffa 
Fig 2:  Promotional article about TITAN network to membership (Teamster Magazine September 1976) 
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disappeared from outside of a restaurant in 1975, and in what became a storied conspiracy, 
his body was never found8 (J. B. Jacobs and Cooperman 2011).  
In one of his first acts as General President, Frank Fitzsimmons made one the chief 
technical investment of his decade in power. He contracted with the Honeywell corporation 
to build a state of the art networked, mainframe computer data processing system9. General 
Secretary Thomas Flynn introduced the system at the quinquennial 1971 Miami convention. 
He encouraged each member to visit the display, and gave them their first introduction to its 
capabilities, 
We will keep membership records on the computers, and they will be available to the 
local union merely by pushing a button. The system is as easy to operate as your TV 
set or an adding machine. I ask that each and every one of you, as an obligation to 
yourself and your membership visit our data processing exhibit. 10 
 
He went further to promise delegates a new technical equity in corporate negotiations, 
 
I assure you, you will be amazed…This is progress. Yes, this is 21st century stuff, 
and in the modern world, it is the most modern system available. It should be 
available to you, just as it is to the corporations with whom each of you meet across 
the bargaining table” (ibid). 
 
Honeywell was in the business of “high cost electronic capital goods” (Campbell-Kelly 
2004: loc 344), and in the 1950’s  partnered with Raytheon to compete with IBM, then 
dominating the computer industry. Honeywell launched its model 200 computer in 1963, 
which ran IBM software (ibid). The IBT joined the ranks of forward thinking industrial firms 
in their decision to invest in networked computer system. The commercial potential of 
extensive industrial computing was pioneered by American Airlines’ development of a 
                                                 
8 Declared legally dead in absentia in 1982, Hoffa’s disappearance is by now a cult cultural reference on par 
with Bigfoot, the JFK assassination, or Area 51, with dozens of films, books, and even a rock band named after 
him.  
9 IBT 0019 Series 1 Box 1 Folder 8   
10IBT 0019 Series 1 Box 1 Folder 23 
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revolutionary seat ticketing system in response to the rapidly increasing popularity of air 
travel in the 1960’s (Kidder 1982).  
Before the IBT built TITAN, mainframe computers served government, military, and 
large corporations. It was a tool for the most dominant agents in society. With the Honeywell 
computer, the IBT made a claim to their seat at the table in industrial society governance. 
The IBT was the most powerful union in the country, and the organization communicated in 
1971 to both membership and adversaries that it was just as equipped as its most advanced 
corporate counterparts.  
In its first iteration, the “Teamster Communication Network” linked Minneapolis, 
Washington DC, and Miami11. Five years Fitzsimmons reflected on the system (by then 
renamed the Teamster Information Terminal and Accounting Network, or TITAN), as his 
“most controversial” decision as general president12. The system at first handled dues 
accounting, membership database needs, and by the late 1970’s made it possible to send 
electronic mail between locals, regional bodies, and the international (Lucore 2002: 208) 
Ten years later, with “some 700 terminals installed, over 90% of our total active membership 
is participating in the largest high-speed communications network in the free world”13.  In 
other words, union membership was sending electronic mail on a regular basis before 1980, 
a decade before it became commercially available through services like Prodigy or AOL.   
Most delegates to the 1971 convention would most likely never have encountered a 
computer.  In these early days, computers “inspired widespread awe” and the press called 
them ”giant brains” (Kidder 1982: 11).  IBT leadership built a display for an audience that 
                                                 
11 IBT 0019 Series 1 Box 1 Folder 8 
12 Coming from a man both under investigation by the federal government for theft of the union’s pension funds 
and as well as withstanding national scrutiny about the 1975 disappearance and presumed assassination of 
former General President Hoffa, a statement of this tenor about a database system stands out. 
13 IBT0019 Series 1 Box 5 Folder 15 
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did not understand how computers worked or of what they were capable. The 1971 display 
included artwork depicting the computer room at IBT headquarters and a simplified 
schematic of the communications network14. Honeywell rented a terminal for the duration of 
the conference so that delegates could witness the system’s functionality in real time15. 
Additionally, Honeywell engaged a creative metaphor to help those new to computers 
understand what they could do and why the union needed them, the Emett Computer. 
In one of the more delightful moments in the history of the computer, Honeywell 
corporation contracted with artist and cartoonist Rowland Emett to build a whimsical 
computer sculpture display. In an attempt to communicate some of what went on inside the 
machines, Honeywell Controls Ltd., the British office of the American company, asked 
Emett to imagine and create a display. He built the Honeywell “Forget me Not” Computer 
(Schmidt 1966). The company included Emett computer in their 1971 convention display16 .  
A reporter several years earlier described the device, 
The machine has three units: FRED (Fantastically Rapid Evaluator and Dispenser) 
and two pachyderms (elephants never forget). FRED, who wears a tartan - 
Honeywell computers are made in Scotland - and has mechanical butterflies and 
revolving magnetic tape in his stomach, leans on his static-discharged umbrella, 
reads the "program" with one hand and feeds an "information" bun to the first 
pachyderm whose insides are the core of the computer. There are (sic) a maze of 
gently moving wheels, levers and pulleys, reminiscent of a Rube Goldberg invention. 
But where the American cartoonist's brain children brimmed with action, Mr. Emett's 
machine is more restful, with some of the symbolism of Alice and Wonderland. 
Everything works, sways, and turns about rhythmically and quietly. Nothing whirls, 
whirs or flashes. Lights shine behind lampshades illuminating moving forms in 
cream and gold and light blue… (Schmidt 1966) 
 
                                                 
14 IBT 0019 Series 1 Box 1 Folder 8 
15 IBT0019 Series 1 Box 1 Folder 14 
16 ibid 
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Fig 3: A sketch of the Honeywell-Emettt “Forget-Me-Not” computer on display at the IBT 1971 convention. 
Source: http://www.chrisbeetles.com/gallery/cartoons/honeywell-emett-forget-me-not-pheripheral-
pachyderm-computer.html 
 
We do not know what kind of impression Emett’s educational sculpture made on 
convention attendees.17 Did the truckers, warehouse workers and union bureaucrats learn 
something from the whirring elephant and “card punch-read unit”? Did they better 
understand the principle of a computer program, or of memory? The Emett Computer 
resulted from the creative culture of an early industry in a period of ferment. The corporation 
and the artist attempted to communicate something entirely new to a public audience. That 
the IBT allowed such a bizarre display speaks to the novelty of the entire project. More 
importantly, this event is evidence of a union’s effort to adopt and promote new technologies 
to benefit the organization and its membership.  
                                                 
17Honeywell’s invoice for the conference also included a “sculptured animals” display (IBT0019 Series 1 Box 
1 Folder 8), but it is unclear if these were in any way related to the Emett computer. 
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 The union’s investment into cutting edge technologies continued throughout the 
decade18. By 1976 the IBT transitioned from telephone modem communications to 
commercial satellite.  This contributed to the IBT’s project of crafting an image of the 
organization as a modern, competitive, high tech organization in a changing world. In a 
speech at the 1976 convention, General Secretary Ray Schlossing informed delegates that, 
 
…the International Union, with support given by a mandate of delegates to the 
1971 convention, took a monumental step into the 21st century by employing space-
age technology to create TITAN” (Teamster Magazine September 1974: 24). 
 
And five years later at the 1981 convention, Secretary Schlossing updated delegates that,  
 
…with some 700 terminals installed, over 90% of our total active membership is 
participating in the largest high-speed communications network in the free world. 
Indeed, through the facilities of the WESTAR communications satellite and 
A.T.&T., over 400 million characters of information are transmitted daily over the 
TITAN network. Local Union office personnel throughout the United States and 
Canada utilize the system over 200,000 times a day.”19 
 
Another reason suggested by the IBT’s convention speeches for the intensive 
investment in computing was the need for union transparency, as a move shore up loyalty 
and trust among membership. The IBT was under national scrutiny for shady investment 
deals, embezzlement, and fraud (La Botz 1990). In his 1971 convention address, President 
Fitzsimmons offered a weak acknowledgement of the scandals, giving vague explanations 
for international union expenses,  
We spend a lot of money in litigation, sometimes because of damage suits what need 
not have been. We have contributed a lot of money to social causes through the  
A.L.A. The Teamster Labor Institute costs money. The Affiliate Pension Fund cost 
money. The International Teamster Magazine cost money. So, when someone says, 
                                                 
18 Another ambitious political organization was investing in advanced computing at exactly the same time as the 
IBT. From 1971 to 1973 Chilean president Salvador Allende created Project Cybersyn, a nationally networked 
cybernetic system designed to help the new government manage the economy in real time. Pushing the limits of 
what was technically possibly at the time, the Cybersyn team, he hoped to usher in a democratic socialism with 
the aid of cutting edge technologies (Medina 2011) 
19 IBT 0019 Series 1 Box 5 Folder 15 
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‘where does the money go?’ tell them to look at the officers’ Report, and ask them if 
they want any of the services cut out. 20 
 
The IBT ran an internal PR campaign, publishing reports from auditors in its monthly 
magazine stating a clean financial bill of health. It also began to make a show of opening up 
membership financial activity to regional union offices. The computer investments were 
presented as both an act of transparency, but also a display of the international’s investment 
in regional leadership (ibid).  
 
B. Computers for Capital : Yale Express 
 
"IBM Machines Trim Yale Express Work Force: Union 'can't milk a dry cow'”  
-Wall Street Journal headline, 1964  
 
Mainframe computers were in use in the trucking industry at least six years before 
the IBT acquired its own system.  Yale Express was one of the most profitable trucking 
companies of the 1960’s, earning some $90 million in profit at its height, and gaining 
attention from wall street investors(Metz 1967).  The company was recognized at the time 
for being one of the most high tech of the national carriers in operation, after being one of 
the first to apply electronics to transportation, and for investing in early automation 
technologies (Hammer 1960). 
But in 1964, the Yale Express trucking company had a problem. The company had 
just come out of national negotiations with the IBT, and company management expected 
costs to rise21. They turned to IBM mainframe computing and information systems to find 
ways to save. At the company’s annual meeting in Florida that year, they pitted management 
against a computer with a typical logistics problem: “Find the cheapest way to move trailers 
around to correct a shortage at five terminals and a shortage at six”. The computer saved 
between $260 and $680 and won “hands down” (Ricklefs 1964).  The company reported 
additionally they had ramped up their loss claims with computers, and could now analyze 
                                                 
20 Ibid  
21 I did not find any reports of company management reducing upper level salaries to counter rising labor costs 
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10,000 claims a minute to look for trouble areas in their national operations (Martin 1965). 
Ricklefs (1964) summed up Yale Express’s spur towards computers for the Wall Street 
Journal, writing that trucking companies,  
 
…caught in a squeeze between rising wage costs and rate-cutting competition 
from railroads, are searching vigorously for ways to trim overhead. And increasingly, 
the answer seems to be new capital equipment, ranging from computers and 
automated freight handling systems to bigger trucks.  
 
Operators expressed concern that the Teamsters would resist automation equipment, but 
by in large the union understood and supported the logistics upgrades, knowing they 
acknowledged the need to cut costs. The union wanted the industry to grow, and knew that 
they “couldn’t milk a dry cow” (ibid). Where would the labor cuts come, then? Secretarial 
staff22, in the case of Yale Express, would pay the price with their jobs,  
 
By the end of this year, Yale expects to have three computer systems plus equipment 
linking major terminals to the computers. The total rental will be about $720,00 a 
year. With them, Yale will be able to use 150 clerical workers to do the job that 600 
used to do with electric accounting machines (ibid).  
 
Trucking companies, like other corporations, were early adopters of computers in the 
late 1960’s and throughout the 1970’s. The task of coordinating multi-layered logistics 
puzzles in every shipment made computers immediately useful.  
 
IV. TECHNOMANAGEMENT: “LIE DETECTORS”AND SUPER 
TRUCKS 
 
Trucking carriers promoted two controversial technologies in the 1970’s: the 
polygraph machine and a redesign of the cab. The IBT published critics of both technologies, 
and commissioned a university study on the latter. I did not find evidence that Overdrive 
                                                 
22 Harry Braverman’s work analyzing the skill decline in secretarial labor in Labor and Monopoly Capital is 
not the most often cited section of the work, but just as inciteful as his work on machinists and industrial labor.  
  37 
mobilized politically around polygraph machines or cab redesigns. As independent truck 
drivers owned or were in the process of buying their own truck, a company redesign of the 
cab did not affect them. Similarly, trucking companies reported using the polygraph 
machines during pre-hire interviews, as such this practice would not have necessarily 
impacted an independent contractor in the same was as an employee. These technologies 
demonstrate Winner’s second category of inherently political technologies, in this case used 
by carriers against drivers, against which the union mobilized financial and political 
resources to attempt to block these technologies, which it deemed as threats.   
 
A.  Polygraph as “Lie Detector” 
 
Polygraph machine use by management was common practice in a range of 
industries. Its ability to determine truth telling has been largely rebutted, and, as one 
historian of the gadget has put it, “[d]uring the course of the last century, the polygraph has 
been less an actor in its own right than a mirror that reflects—or magnifies—the 
circumstances that surround it” (Alder 2007:126). The polygraph’s impact is not so much the 
ability to catch a lie, but to produce effects in people who believed it could catch them in a 
lie. The machine’s operators, “assiduously cultivated the public reputation of the instrument 
as infallible and performed various parlor tricks to convince individual subjects that it would 
expose them” (ibid).  
Security companies reported that the value of the machine lay not as method for 
catching a dishonest employee, but in “its value as a deterrent… many potential applicants 
who know they could not pass a polygraphic examination given by a private security firm 
seek employment elsewhere” (Lipman 1988: 86). Polygraph machines fail as lie detectors, 
because as they measure only symptoms of stress or nervousness such as breathing, pulse, 
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blood pressure and skin conditions, the reasons for machine detection are numerous. Studies 
on the machines have found that innocent people who fear punishment, or dishonest people 
who are confident in their performance cause consistently false readings (Ekman 1996). 
News reports from the time frequently referenced Tiffany’s Jewelers, drug stores, and 
banking as major adopters of the gadget. One of the longest running and most bitter boycotts 
led by the AFL-CIO was one against Coors Brewery from 1977-1987, with one of the most 
inflammatory issues being around polygraph use. Brewery management used lie detectors 
during hiring, but extended questions into potential employees’ personal lives. During the 
strike and boycott, union warehouse and transportation workers “signed sworn statements 
claiming they were asked questions such as ‘Have you ever cheated on your wife', or ‘Have 
you had sex with one or more persons... What kind of sex’ by polygraph operators at Coors 
during the preemployment test” (Pryor 1977). After the passage of congressional legislation 
in 1988 polygraph machines were banned in the private sector, but to this day they remain in 
use by the federal government and continue to cause controversy (Miller 2000)  
The American Trucking Associations (ATA), incorporated in 1933 and representing 
tens of thousands of trucking companies, was an active user of and lobbyist for lie detectors 
on the job(United States 1978). Management defended the use of machines to question 
employees about drug use and theft, but their use was much more widespread, as seen in the 
Coors Brewery controversy. In congressional debate over a bill that would not pass for 
another decade, a representative of the American Polygraph Association testified to their use 
of the machines for trucking carrier clients in preemployment interviews:  
 
Mr. Barefoot. With an over-the-road driver, I would especially be concerned with 
the use of drugs on the job, with what we call “bennies” or “uppers” or things that 
keep you awake while you are behind the wheel. These are the things that contribute 
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to accidents. That is what truckers usually go in for. As a group, truckers, if they use 
drugs, pretty much confine themselves to certain items.  
 
Senator Bayh. What questions would you ask me in the preemployment kind of 
situation? 
 
Mr. Barefoot. I would ask you if you had ever used drugs illegally while driving or 
while on the job(ibid: 51) 
 
Polygraph use was vigorously defended by representatives of the polygraph industry, and 
also by corporate sectors that used their services, as with trucking or retail. Harry Hunter of 
the National Association of Convenience Stores testified to congress on the convoluted 
requirement/non-requirements for taking the polygraph test in his industry, which was 
recognized to be common practice by the committee later in the hearings,  
 
[a]lthough submission to the test is voluntary, it is specified as a condition of 
employment… in the event of refusal to submit to the test, the employee either will 
not be hired, or if already hired, will be terminated (United States 1978:294). 
 
The employee had a choice to forgo the polygraph as much as she had the choice to walk 
away from employment.  
The ATA’s representative to congress was John Mazzei, director of security control 
for the trucking company Transcon Line, In in New Jersey. Mazzei stated that a result of a 
congressional ban on polygraph use would be increased cargo theft, the cost of which would 
be passed on directly to the consumer. He claimed that already loss in the industry due to 
employee theft amounted to a figure “rapidly approaching $1 billion per year” (ibid: 296) 
Therefore, the ATA took the position that,  
 
…we do not support the provisions of Senate Bill 1845 because we believe that, if 
enacted, the Bill would do more to protect the criminal element and promote 
thievery, than it would to protect the innocent. For many years our industry has used 
polygraph testing as part of the hiring process and we have used such testing in the 
event of theft and hijacking to determine which employees were definitely not 
involved in the crime (ibid: 295).  
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In 1987 the Teamsters reunited with the AFL-CIO, which lobbied for the Employee 
Polygraph Protection Act (EPPA), eventually passed in 1988 (Karr 1987). While the 
polygraph technology was in use against workers in many industries for decades, the union 
Coors delivery drivers put the technology on their radar. The larger political implications for 
labor was its use in grievance arbitration, as the union preferred a federal ban on the machine 
over piecemeal restriction through collective bargaining (Teamster Magazine, July 1978: 
24).  
There are two ways in which the IBT revealed knowledge of and possible 
involvement with resisting the use of Polygraphs. The union published a report, “Polygraph 
Doesn’t Mix with Jobs” in September 1975 during congressional subcommittee actions on 
the topic. The magazine’s summary of the report was short, and included language critical of 
the technology, 
 
The use of polygraphs- so-called “lie detectors” in screening job applicants is an 
invasion of privacy and should be outlawed. Report on US Senate Constitutional 
Rights Subcommittee’s progress. “Legislation in line with the [committee’s] 
recommendation has been introduced in each of the last three Congresses, but no 
action has ever been taken on it.   (Teamster Magazine, September 1975: 27)  
 
Second, by the time a bill to ban use of the technology on employees was being debated 
in congress, the IBT had rejoined the AFL-CIO, which actively lobbied for the ban (Shafer 
1986).  
 
B. Super Trucks 
 
The second managerial technologies engaged with by the union was a cab redesign. 
With the legal overall vehicle length maxed out in most states at 55 feet, carriers were eager 
to exploit every conceivable cubic inch. Wherever possible, cabs were squeezed so tight that 
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some allowed for only 12 inches between the back of the seat and the steering wheel. Bigger 
drivers found their paunches pushed up against the steering wheel. One proposal was the 
"cab under" redesign from the major trailer manufacturer Strick Corporation. By squeezing 
the cab underneath the container, the company could potentially claim an extra 600 cubic 
feet of payload space (Sherrill 1977) 
 
 
Fig 4: A prototype of the “cab under” design. Source: https://www.odometer.com/rides/2325510/15-of-
historys-wackiest-rides/?drv=6537-yde#slide/8/0 
 
The IBT organized against the cab-under road tests. While all the while “encouraging 
increased productivity”23, the union lobbied against the redesign and in 1978 commissioned 
an independent safety study from the University of Michigan. 
The study found “major safety deficiencies” in road visibility, ability to sense vehicle 
roll, and driver fatigue and morale (Highway Safety Research Institute 1978).  General 
President Fitzsimmons decried the discomfort of the design and the vulnerable position of 
the driver in the event of a crash.  The Michigan study additionally reported that interviews 
with drivers of the prototype reported strong negative opinions of the new technology, and 
anticipated that driver acceptance would be a major hurdle to widespread implementation of 
the cab-under.  The creative and extreme measures represented in the cab under have 
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returned decades later, as increasingly autonomous trucking seems to make possible the 
reopening of this same debate.  
  
V. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER QUESTIONS: THE NEAR FUTURE 
AND THE PRESENT DAY 
 
Considering this history provides us with a frame to consider newer technologies. In the 
1970’s, carriers were unable to fully control the political, economic, and technological 
conditions of trucking. After federal deregulation, carriers were able to slash driver wages. 
Technologies proposed by carriers to increase productivity and control were successful held 
back by the IBT and the AFL-CIO. Just as carriers were able to take advantage of post-
deregulation politically (through the decline of unionized truckers) and economically 
(through the reduction in labor costs), are they also benefitting technologically?   
The analysis in this research leaves us with a few areas for further questions in 
considering 21st century trucking technologies. These can help to begin to answer the more 
difficult question of whether the political and economic impacts of deregulation also made 
any lasting effects with regard to contemporary trucking technologies. First, are there ways 
in which contemporary technologies similar to technologies in play during the pivotal decade 
of the 1970’s? Comparisons should ask what political organization is advocating a 
technology’s use, the intended purpose of the technology, and finally, what, if any, resistance 
there is to the technology. Finally, returning to Winner’s theoretical framing, future research 
should ask whether contemporary technologies seem to be either “resolving an issue” of the 
particular political organization adoption them, or displaying elements of “inherent” politics.  
                                                                                                                                                      
23 David Noble’s “friends of labor”  
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Table 3: Technology Comparisons 
Technology Platoons Cab Under Electronic 
Logging Device 
Polygraph 
Stated purpose of 
use in trucking 
Fuel efficiency,  
labor savings 
Increased 
transportation 
load 
Safety and 
compliance  
Catch and deter 
theft 
Supporting Political 
Organization 
 
Carriers Carriers Carriers Carriers 
Types of Resistance Organized 
against by IBT 
Organized 
against by IBT 
Organized against 
by independent 
truckers and IBT 
Organized against 
by AFL-CIO, 
criticized by IBT 
 
 
A. Electronic Logging devices / Polygraphs  
 
The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) has begun a mandated 
phase in of Electronic Logging Devices (ELDs)24. These devices are intended to replace 
truckers’ paper logs that track when they drive, sleep, and rest. Carriers track these 
biorhythms to enforce federal requirements for time on the road and hours slept before a 
driver may drive again, but extract as much productive driving time as possible(Levy 2015). 
The ATA has lobbied for passage of an ELD mandate, citing highway safety and 
compliance as its chief reasons for supporting the technology (Penton Media 2012). 
Truckers, both independent and union, have mobilized demonstrations and shut downs 
against the mandate. Overdrive magazine reported on one Florida shut down, quoting owner 
operators on site: “a machine doesn’t have a common-sense mind”, that “in the end.. it’s all 
about revenue” (Dills 2017). Some drivers reported disappointment in the measure, as they 
had hoped that by supporting President Trump, they would see decreased industry regulation 
(ibid).  
                                                 
24 Truckers still listen to country music. One driver’s rewrote the song after which this paper and broadcast  
“Take this Elog and Shove it” , which received over twenty thousands views.  
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ELDs were originally proposed to address the problem of drivers’ abuse of drive and 
rest time. Because drivers are paid per mile, they are pressured to find ways to stay awake, as 
with drug abuse, and falsify paper log books to move freight “at the pace of work demanded 
by the market” (Levy 2015: 163). Large carriers were the first to adopt the devices, but many 
vigorously opposed their installation. Chief among complaints are invasion of privacy, cost, 
efficacy, and increased harassment by dispatchers. Whereas before truck driving was one of 
the most independent blue-collar jobs, with minimal ability for close oversight by managers, 
the introduction of ELDs changes a fundamental quality of work for drivers (ibid). 
ELDs allow for what carriers had hoped to accomplish with polygraph machines: 
closer control of a mobile workforce. The devices are used to as hard evidence to contradict 
driver claims about road conditions, tiredness, or route. While a broad coalition of worker 
organizations was able to pass legislation blocking the polygraph, ELDs affect only truck 
drivers, and the IBT continues to try unsuccessfully to hold back the new technology (Jaillet 
2018). 
B. Automated Platoons / Cab Under Redesign  
 
The dominant automation prototype for the trucking industry is truck “platoons”, 
with a lead driver at the front of several linked and automatically operated rigs. Like the 
attempted “cab under” model, platoons are a technical redesign of highway trucking with the 
goal of making freight transportation more productive and efficient. Designers hope to 
improve fuel efficiency in the near future, and eventually reduce labor costs, as fuel is the 
greatest cost to trucking companies, followed by salaries (Bergenhem et al. 2012) . Platoons 
involve positioning multiple trucks in close formation. The vehicles would “talk” to each 
other and be linked in their maneuvers on the road. Startup company Peloton, the only 
company in the United States operating legal highway platoons, reports that tests in two-
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truck convoys saw a savings of 4.5% in the front truck, and 10% for the following vehicle 
(CCJ Staff 2017). 
The trucks behind the lead rig in its current prototype are no longer driven for 
portions of the drive. In this model, the skill of operating a vehicle is transferred from the 
driver and managed instead by the onboard computer.  Only the lead truck is actively driven.  
The path to driverless trucks is laid out in published reports by the federal government, and 
mimicked by international governmental transportation agencies. In the United States, the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) identifies five levels of trucking 
automation, from No-Automation (Level 0) to Full Self-Driving Automation (Level 4). 
Level 4   “anticipates that the driver will provide destination or navigation input, but is not 
expected to be available for control at any time during the trip. This includes both occupied 
and unoccupied vehicles” (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 2013).  
Fully automated trucks are not merely a future projection. Trucking carrier Otto, a 
subsidiary of Uber, has already run an automated test drive transporting 20,000 cases of 
Budweiser beer from Fort Collins to Colorado Springs. The only human in the cab sat in the 
sleeper berth for the entire trip (Dickinson 2018). Two public private collaborations in 
Sweden are running tests on platoon safety and road maneuverability. Of the three biggest 
concerns motivating the study, the second listed is “driver acceptance” of the technologies 
(J. Larson, K. Y. Liang, and K. H. Johansson 2015). 
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Fig 5: Platoon diagram. Source: https://www.labroots.com/trending/chemistry-and-physics/7405/band-
semi-trailers-truck-platooning 
  
The German company Daimler Corporation’s American subsidiary is one of the 
leading manufacturers of heavy-duty trucks in United States. In 2017 at the North American 
Commercial Vehicle Show in Atlanta Georgia, the company announced road tests of 
automated platooning operations on US public highways. The company had already run test 
operations on closed courses near their headquarters in Oregon, where at least two trucks and 
trailers were “paired”. The company’s press release for the Atlanta event including a 
message from North American CEO, Roger Nielson. Roger Nielson is concerned about 
drivers. Nielson promises truckers of North America that “this technology stands for more 
efficiency and safety. Platooning technology is not meant to replace drivers – it’s designed to 
help drivers”. The CEO has even driven one of the paired vehicles himself, and his 
experience was “impressive. (Daimler Communications 2017). 
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In this case, like the more isolated example of the “cab under”, the truck redesign is 
being pushed by carriers, like Tesla, Otto, Volvo, and Peloton (Muoio 2017).  As for 
organized resistance to the technologies, the IBT is actively engaged in lobbying against any 
changes in federal regulation that would allow these trucks on the roads. In an interview with 
the Wall Street Journal, General President James P. Hoffa cited concerns over safety and 
jobs (Shepardson 2017). Future research should include analysis of ongoing congressional 
debates on possible highway legislation.  
 
C. Concluding Thoughts  
 
Viewing technological development as a social process rather than as an 
autonomous, transcendent, and deterministic force can be liberating (if one ignores 
the awesome force of social power), because it opens up a realm of freedom too long 
denied. It restores people once again to their proper role as subjects of the story… 
Finally, if technological development is a social process, it is, like all social 
processes, marked by conflict and struggle, and the outcome, therefore, is always 
indeterminate (Noble 1984: 324). 
 
 Surveillance technologies have arrived at scale for now, but fully autonomous 
trucking may never reach the same penetration. Instead of perceiving automation as a 
totality, we should instead look at it as a spectrum, and consider the impact of shifts along 
this spectrum on drivers, as compared to any technological change introduced by managers.  
In studying both the historical and current impacts of technologies on trucking 
organizations and work, I am struck by the social nature of technological change. With 
several decades distance from the 1970’s, we can see that technologies were not inevitable. 
The polygraph was and continues to be banned from commercial use as a result of a political 
process, and carriers were unable to limit CB use by drivers.  
But the people who run companies like Daimler Corporation show signs of 
experience in the social process of technological change and its potentially unexpected 
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outcomes. For all the optimism throughout their press materials of the company’s truck 
platooning launch, the documents include an addendum that speaks to the corporation’s 
vision of these possible futures (emphasis mine):   
 
This document contains forward-looking statements that reflect our current views 
about future events... These statements are subject to many risks and uncertainties, 
including an adverse development of global economic conditions … events of force 
majeure including natural disasters, acts of terrorism, political unrest, armed 
conflicts, industrial accidents and their effects on our sales, purchasing, production or 
financial services activities; changes in currency exchange rates… disruption of 
production due to shortages of materials, labor strikes or supplier insolvencies… 
(Daimler Communications 2017).  
 
In just a short addendum, the corporation signals its consideration of war, revolution, strikes, 
and boycotts. A company as old as Daimler is aware of the impermanence of the status quo 
and the opportunities and risks made possible by instability. 
Creeping and overt technological determinism run rampant in the popular and 
academic literature. Perhaps it because we do not understand the technologies acting on our 
lives, and therefore we fear them. We imagine that the technology in general determines 
society and our future in it (Winner 1977). Studies like this one, which look closely at 
technologies in the context of their political and economic histories, help to hold back a 
sense of technological determinism about both the past and the present.  We can see that 
technologies operate in myriad ways and can be deployed for or against the interest of 
workers. When carriers promote technologies that will change the nature of work in an 
industry like trucking, it is within our reach to make initial comparisons even within the 
same industry.    
 
 
 
 
  
  49 
 
 
Works Cited 
 
 
Alder, Ken. 2007. “America’s Two Gadgets.” Isis 98 (1): 124–37. https://doi.org/10.1086/512836. 
Associated Press. 1974. “MOST TRUCKERS END 11-DAY STRIKE.” New York Times (1923-
Current File), February. http://search.proquest.com/docview/120176164/. 
Autor, David. 2015. “Why Are There Still So Many Jobs? The History and Future of Workplace 
Automation.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 29 (3): 3–30. 
Ball, Kirstie. 2010. “Workplace Surveillance: An Overview.” Labor History 51 (1): 87–106. 
Belman, Dale L, and Kristen A Monaco. 2001. “The Effects of Deregulation, De-Unionization, 
Technology, and Human Capital on the Work and Work Lives of Truck Drivers.” Industrial 
& Labor Relations Review 54 (2A): 502–524. 
Belzer, Michael H. 2000. Sweatshops on Wheels: Winners and Losers in Trucking Deregulation. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Bergenhem, Carl, Steven Shladover, Erik Coelingh, Christoffer Englund, and Sadayuki Tsugawa. 
2012. Overview of Platooning Systems. 
Bessen, James. 2015. Learning by Doing: The Real Connection between Innovation, Wages, and 
Wealth. New Haven; London: Yale University Press. 
Bix, Amy Sue. 2000. Inventing Ourselves out of Jobs: America’s Debate over Technological 
Unemployment, 1929-1981. Studies in Industry and Society. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins 
University Press. 
Bloch, Doug. 2007. “Sweatshops on Wheels: Union-Community Coalition Takes Aim at Port 
Trucking.” Race, Poverty & the Environment 14 (1): 61–62. 
Bound, John, and George Johnson. 1992. “Changes in the Structure of Wages in the 1980’s: An 
Evaluation of Alternative Explanations.” The American Economic Review 82 (3). 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/233034087/. 
Braverman, Harry. 1998. Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth 
Century. 25th anniversary ed. New York: Monthly Review Press. 
Brynjolfsson, Erik. 2014. The Second Machine Age: Work, Progress, and Prosperity in a Time of 
Brilliant Technologies. First Edition. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2017. “May 2017 National Occupational Employment and Wage 
Estimates.” 2017. https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes_nat.htm#53-0000. 
Bureau of Transportation Statistics. 2017. “Freight Facts & Figures 2017 - Chapter 2: Freight 
Moved in Domestic and International Trade | Bureau of Transportation Statistics.” 2017. 
https://www.bts.gov/bts-publications/freight-facts-and-figures/freight-facts-figures-2017-
chapter-2-freight-moved. 
Campbell-Kelly, Martin. 2004. Computer: A History of the Information Machine. 2nd ed.. Sloan 
Technology Series. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press. 
Castells, Manuel. 2000. The Rise of the Network Society. 2nd ed. Castells, Manuel, 1942- 
Information Age; v. 1. Oxford; Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers. 
CCJ Staff. 2017. “Peloton Shows Platooning in MI; Commercial Release in 2018.” December 14, 
2017. https://www.ccjdigital.com/peloton-shows-truck-platooning-in-michigan-commercial-
release-set-for-2018/. 
Daimler Communications. 2017. “Daimler Trucks Tests Truck Platooning on Public Highways in 
the US.” 
Daniels, Jessie. 2018. “The Algorithmic Rise of the ‘Alt-Right.’” Contexts 17 (1): 60–65. 
Dickinson, Tim. 2018. “Death of the American Trucker - Rolling Stone.” January 2, 2018. 
https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/features/death-of-the-american-trucker-w514802. 
  50 
Dills, Todd. 2017. “ELD Protest Enters Third Day in Miami.” December 20, 2017. 
https://www.overdriveonline.com/eld-protest-enters-third-day-in-miami/. 
Dimaggio, P, E Hargittai, Wr Neuman, and JP Robinson. 2001. “Social Implications of the Internet.” 
Annual Review of Sociology 27: 307–336. 
Dinardo, John, and Thomas Lemieux. 1997. “Diverging Male Wage Inequality in the United States 
and Ganada, 1981–1988: Do Institutions Explain the Difference?” Industrial & Labor 
Relations Review 50 (4): 629–651. 
Dyer-Witheford, Nick. 1999. Cyber-Marx: Cycles and Circuits of Struggle in High-Technology 
Capitalism. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 
Ekman, Paul. 1996. “Why Don’t We Catch Liars?” Social Research 63 (3): 801–817. 
Fischer, Claude S. 1988. “‘Touch Someone’: The Telephone Industry Discovers Sociability.” 
Technology and Culture 29 (1): 32–61. 
Flint, Jerry. 1978. “A Day of Warfare for Truckers Moving Steel on Midwest Roads.” The New York 
Times, December 7, 1978, sec. Archives. https://www.nytimes.com/1978/12/07/archives/a-
day-of-warfare-for-truckers-moving-steel-on-midwest-roads-a-day.html. 
Ford, Martin. 2015. Rise of the Robots: Technology and the Threat of a Jobless Future. New York: 
Basic Books, a member of the Perseus Books Group. 
Foucault, Michel. 1995. Discipline and Punish : The Birth of the Prison. 2nd Vintage Books ed.. 
New York: Vintage Books. 
Freedman, David H. 2017. “If Automation Is Already Messing with Our Economy and Our Politics, 
Just Wait until Self-Driving Trucks Arrive.” MIT Technology Review. March 2017. 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/603493/10-breakthrough-technologies-2017-self-
driving-trucks/. 
Frey, Carl Benedikt, and Michael A. Osborne. 2017. “The Future of Employment: How Susceptible 
Are Jobs to Computerisation?” Technological Forecasting & Social Change 114 (January): 
254–280. 
Hamilton, Shane. 2008. Trucking Country: The Road to America’s Wal-Mart Economy. Politics and 
Society in Twentieth-Century America. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Hammer, Alexander R. 1960. “Automation, TV, Speed Trucking.” New York Times (1923-Current 
File), October. http://search.proquest.com/docview/115148365/. 
Haring, Kristen. 2007. Ham Radio’s Technical Culture. Inside Technology. Cambridge, Mass: MIT 
Press. 
Harris, David. 1974. “The Truckers Go to Washington: Democracy on the Interstate.” Rolling Stone, 
April 25, 1974. https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/features/the-truckers-go-to-
washington-19740425. 
Hirsch, Barry, and David MacPherson. 1998. “Earnings and Employment in Trucking: Deregulating 
a Naturally Competitive Industry.” In Regulatory Reform and Labor Markets. Recent 
Economic Thought Series; 61. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Horwitz, Robert B. 1986. “Understanding Deregulation.” Theory and Society 15 (1–2): 139–174. 
J. Larson, K. Y. Liang, and K. H. Johansson. 2015. “A Distributed Framework for Coordinated 
Heavy-Duty Vehicle Platooning.” IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems 
16 (1): 419–29. https://doi.org/10.1109/TITS.2014.2320133. 
Jacobs, James B., and Kerry T. Cooperman. 2011. Breaking the Devil’s Pact: The Battle to Free the 
Teamsters from the Mob. New York: NYU Press. 
Jacobs, Meg. 2016. Panic at the Pump: The Energy Crisis and the Transformation of American 
Politics in the 1970s. 1st edition.. New York: Hill and Wang, a division of Farrar, Straus 
and Giroux. 
Jaillet, James. 2018. “House Committee Clears Bill with ELD Waiver for Livestock Haulers, 
Dismissal of State-Mandated Driver Breaks.” Overdrive Online. May 25, 2018. 
https://www.overdriveonline.com/house-committee-clears-bill-with-eld-waiver-for-
livestock-haulers-dismissal-of-state-mandated-driver-breaks/. 
  51 
Karr, Albert R. 1987. “House Labor Panel Clears Bill to Bar Use of Lie-Detector Tests by 
Employers.” Wall Street Journal (1923 - Current File), June. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/135203019/. 
Kidder, Tracy. 1982. The Soul of a New Machine. New York: Avon. 
Kristal, Tali. 2013. “The Capitalist Machine: Computerization, Workers’ Power, and the Decline in 
Labor’s Share within U.S. Industries.” American Sociological Review 78 (3): 361–389. 
Kuttner, Robert. 1987. The Life of the Party: Democratic Prospects in 1988 and Beyond. New York, 
NY: Viking. 
La Botz, Dan. 1990. Rank and File Rebellion: Teamsters for a Democratic Union. Haymarket Series 
on North American Politics and Culture. London; New York: Verso. 
Levy, Karen E. C. 2015. “The Contexts of Control: Information, Power, and Truck-Driving Work.” 
The Information Society 31 (2): 160–174. 
Lichtenstein, Nelson. 2013. State of the Union: A Century of American Labor. Revised and 
expanded edition. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Liker, Jeffrey K., Carol J. Haddad, and Jennifer Karlin. 1999. “Perspectives on Technology and 
Work Organization.” Annual Review of Sociology 25 (1): 575–96. 
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.25.1.575. 
Lipman, Ira A. 1988. “Personnel Selection in the Private Security Industry: More Than a Résumé.” 
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 498 (July): 83–90. 
Martin, Richard. 1965. “Truckers, Railroads Push Drives to Trim Freight Claim Losses.” Wall Street 
Journal (1923 - Current File), January. http://search.proquest.com/docview/133051256/. 
Marx, Karl. 1867. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. V. 1: Penguin Classics. London; New 
York, N.Y: Penguin Books in association with New Left Review. 
“Master Freight Agreement.” n.d. Teamsters. Accessed May 21, 2018. 
https://teamster.org/about/teamster-history/freight-agreement. 
Medina, Eden. 2011. Cybernetic Revolutionaries: Technology and Politics in Allende’s Chile. 
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Metz, By Robert. 1967. “Market Place: Yale Express Rolling Again.” New York Times (1923-
Current File), October. http://search.proquest.com/docview/117849178/. 
Milkman, Ruth. 2006. L.A. Story: Immigrant Workers and the Future of the U.S. Labor Movement. 
New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Moonfire (1973). n.d. Accessed May 10, 2018. https://letterboxd.com/film/moonfire/. 
Morris, Martina, and Bruce Western. 1999. “Inequality in Earnings at the Close of the Twentieth 
Century.” Annual Review of Sociology 25 (January): 623–657. 
Muoio, Danielle. 2017. “Here’s How Tesla, Uber, and Google Are Trying to Revolutionize the 
Trucking Industry.” Business Insider. June 20, 2017. 
http://www.businessinsider.com/autonomous-trucks-tesla-uber-google-2017-6. 
Noble, David F. 1984. Forces of Production: A Social History of Industrial Automation. 1st ed. New 
York: Knopf. 
Penton Media. 2012. “ATA Pressing for Mandate on Electronic Logging Devices.” Trailer / Body 
Builders, May. http://search.proquest.com/docview/1011305973/. 
Pierce, Lamar, Daniel C. Snow, and Andrew McAfee. 2015. “Cleaning House: The Impact of 
Information Technology Monitoring on Employee Theft and Productivity.” Management 
Science 61 (10): 2299–2319. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.2103. 
Ricklefs, Roger. 1964. “Tools for Truckers.” Wall Street Journal (1923 - Current File), August. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/132933453/. 
Schmidt, Dana Adams. 1966. “A Computer for Those Who Try To Forget: Briton Introduces a 
Machine Recalling Rube Goldberg.” New York Times, October 3, 1966. 
Seeger, Murray. 1965. “Hoffa’s Aid Asked for Yale Express.” New York Times (1923-Current File), 
July. http://search.proquest.com/docview/116917655/. 
  52 
Shafer, Compiled By Ronald G. 1986. “Washington Wire.” Wall Street Journal (1923 - Current 
File), June. http://search.proquest.com/docview/135125151/. 
Shepardson, David. 2017. “Teamsters Chief Fears U.S. Self-Driving Trucks May Be Unsafe, Hit 
Jobs.” Reuters, September 12, 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-autos-selfdriving-
teamsters/teamsters-chief-fears-u-s-self-driving-trucks-may-be-unsafe-hit-jobs-
idUSKCN1BN337. 
Shestakofsky, Benjamin. 2017. “Working Algorithms: Software Automation and the Future of 
Work.” Work and Occupations, August. https://doi.org/10.1177/0730888417726119. 
Silver, Beverly J. 2003. Forces of Labor: Workers’ Movements and Globalization since 1870. 
Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Srnicek, Nick. 2015. Inventing the Future: Folk Politics and the Left. London; New York: Verso. 
Stein, Judith. 2010. Pivotal Decade: How the United States Traded Factories for Finance in the 
Seventies. New Haven [Conn.]: Yale University Press. 
United States, Congress. 1978. Polygraph Control and Civil Liberties Protection Act: Hearings 
before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Committee on the Judiciary, United 
States Senate, Ninety-Fifth Congress, First and Second Sessions, No S. 1845 .. U.S. Govt. 
Print. Off.,. http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015078640714. 
Viscelli, Steve. 2016. The Big Rig: Trucking and the Decline of the American Dream. Oakland, 
California: University of California Press. 
Walker, Jesse. 2001. Rebels on the Air: An Alternative History of Radio in America. New York: 
New York University Press. 
Watts, Tyler, and Jared Barton. 2011. “‘I Can’t Drive 55’: The Economics of the CB Radio 
Phenomenon.” The Independent Review 15 (3): 383–397. 
Weber, Max, and Guenther. 2013. Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. Vol. 
2: ... Nachdr. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. 
Weeks, Kathi. 2011. The Problem with Work: Feminism, Marxism, Antiwork Politics, and Postwork 
Imaginaries. Durham: Duke University Press. 
Winner, Langdon. 1977. Autonomous Technology: Technics-out-of-Control as a Theme in Political 
Thought. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. 
———. 1988. The Whale and the Reactor. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Wood, Adrian. 1994. North-South Trade, Employment, and Inequality: Changing Fortunes in a 
Skill-Driven World. IDS Development Studies Series. Oxford [England] : New York: 
Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press. 
Writer, Bill Miller Washington Post Staff. 2000. “Applicants to File Suit Over Polygraph Exams.” 
The Washington Post (1974-Current File), March. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1831425962/. 
Young, T. 1985. “The Structure of Democratic Communications.” Mid-American Review of 
Sociology 10 (2). http://search.proquest.com/docview/1308685205/. 
Zuboff, Shoshana. 1988. In the Age of the Smart Machine : The Future of Work and Power. New 
York: Basic Books. 
 
Archival Citations: 
 
Parkhurst, Mike (editor). Overdrive Magazine. April 1973- November 1976. Transamerican  
Press, Inc, Los Angeles, CA.  
Teamster Archives, Labor History Research Center, George Washington University, IBT 0019  
Series 1 Box 1 Folder 8. June 3, 1971 “Teamster Computer Exhibit”. Honeywell Interoffice  
Correspondence.  
Teamster Archives, Labor History Research Center, George Washington University, IBT 0019  
Series 1 Box 1 Folder 23. May 10-July 8 1971. “Thomas Flynn” Speech transcript.   
  53 
Teamster Archives, Labor History Research Center, George Washington University, IBT0019 Series  
1 Box 5 Folder 15. 1981. “Officers’ Report to the 22nd International Convention”. 
Teamster Archives, Labor History Research Center, George Washington University, IBT0019 Series  
1 Box 1 Folder 14. June 3, 1971. Memorandum from Bill Allen (Honeywell) to Thomas E.  
Flynn (IBT). 
Teamster Magazine, International Brotherhood of Teamsters. 1970-1980. Washington, DC.  
  
 
 
 
 
